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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
Damages Recoverable for "Cancerophobia" Caused by Negligence
Plaintiff sustained burns on her shoulder as a result of X-ray treatments ad-
ministered by defendant radiologists. Two years later, when the burns failed to
heal, plaintiff consulted a dermatologist who prescribed medication and advised
plaintiff to have her shoulder checked every six months as a precaution against
cancer. Plaintiff brought this malpractice action against the radiologists, al-
leging negligent administration of X-ray therapy.28 In addition to compensation
for her physical injury, plaintiff claimed damages for mental anguish resulting
from cancerophobia-the phobic apprehension that cancer would ultimately de-
velop in the area of the burn.
Judgment on a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $25,000 was unanimous-
ly affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The Court of AppeaLs
granted leave to appeal solely to pass on the property of the award of $15,000
for mental anguish flowing from cancerophobia.
A divided court affirmed the judgment, stating that the original wrongdoer
is liable for the ultimate result of his act so long as the aggravating acts of others
can be found to flow as a natural and probable consequence of the original in-
jury.29 The Court ruled that the jury's verdict did not extend liability beyond
the limits dictated by public policy and common senseao With regard to the
advice of the dermatologist, the Court said, "Under our law the risk of such advice
and it's effects on the plaintiff must be borne by the wrongdoers who started the
chain of circumstances without which the cancerophobia would not have de-
veloped".
The dissenting judges felt that as a matter of public policy, plaintiff's re-
covery should not include damages for mental anguish suffered in contemplation
of a disease which might never develop and based solely upon the dermatologist's
statement as to possible future developments.
Once the extent of plaintiff's compensable injuries has been determined,
it is a relatively easy matter in this case, to determine defendant's liability for
them. The advice of the dermatologist may be labeled a normal intervening
cause3 1 -one which, though not contemplated by defendant at the time of his
negligence, is nevertheless to be regarded as a normal incident of the risk he
created. Such intervention, even if negligent, would not supersede defendant's
28. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
29. Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934).
30. Ibid.
31. PROSSER, TORTS 270 (2d ed. 1955).
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liability.32 The more difficult problem, however, arises in determining the con-
sequences of the dermatologist's advice which are to be compensable.
It is well settled in New York that a negligent wrongdoer takes his victim
as he finds him and is liable even for consequences that would not have followed
but for plaintiff's abnormal susceptibility.33 Up to this time, however, the Court
had never been called upon to decide whether this rule should be applied so as
to include mental injury unaccompanied by aggravation of plaintiff's physical
condition. If we assume in the instant case that plaintiff's preexiscing neurotic
tendencies had rendered her peculiarly susceptible to anxiety-producing stimuli,
34
.should the restult be different from that reached in cases where plaintiff's pre-
disposition is purely physical?
It has been suggested that in psychic injury cases, recovery should be denied
unless plaintiff's reaction is that of an average individual .3  Thus, in determin-
ing whether the injury is compensable, plaintiff's reaction would be tested by the
same reasonable-man standard that determines whether defendant's conduct is
actionable, and even if psychic injury could be proven, recovery would be denied
if plaintiff's reaction were found to be unreasonable..30 The reason given for this
result, at least in cases where there is no impact, is that unless defendant knows
of the idiosyncracy, it would be impractical to require him to gear his activity to
a world of hypersensitive plaintiffs. 3 7 We may assume from this, that if plain-
tiff's only injury had been mental anguish fl6wing from cancerophobia, then,
even in jurisdictions which do not require impact, recovery would have been
denied if it were established that plaintiff's reaction was not only beyond reason-
able anticipation, but also idio3yncratic. But in the present case it was established
that defendants had violated a duty owed to the plaintiff. Even the dissent agreed
that plaintiff sustained physical injuries serious enough to support a $10,000
verdict. Apparently the majority thought that this $10,000 "guarantee of
genuineness"3 s was sufficient to relieve plaintiff of the burden of showing that
her mental anxiety was a reasonable reaction to the advice of the dermatologist.
At least the majority was satisfied by plaintiff's evidence that her reaction was
32. Sauter v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 66 N.Y. 50 (1876).
33. MeCahill v. New York Transportation Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616
(1911).
34. See Smith and Solomon, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 1, 77.
35. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 193, 282.
36. The reasonableness of plaintiff's reaction may be an issue in nuisance
cases where recovery is denied if the injury would not have been sustained by
a normally constituted person. Rogers v. Elliot, 146 Mass; 349. 15 N.E. 768
(1888); Lord v. DeWitt 116 Fed. 713 (C.C.N.Y. 1902); but cf. Dixon v. Trap
Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944), where the reasonableness of
plaintiff's reaction was not considered.
37. HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS §18.4 (1956).
38. PROSSER, ToRTS 177 (2d ed. 1955).
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plausible- that under the circumstance, the advice she received could cause such
a reaction.
Thus the majority rejected one of the contentions against allowing recovery
for neurotic mental suffering-the fear of false and inflated claims. It did not,
however, consider the more theoretical objection, the notion that the plaintiff
should be held to the same standard as that applied to the defendant. Plaintiff's
reaction, assuming that it flowed partially from a sub-standard state of mind,
might not be considered to be contributory negligence because her injury was
not caused by any volitional act of her own. Her cancerophobia did not result
from any substandard conduct on her part, but was inseparable from her sub-
normal state of mind. The distinction thus drawn between a case of substandard
action and one of substandard reaction, might be justified on the ground that
although the law may attempt to influence volitional physical activity, it cannot
presume to operate in the area of purely emotional responses.
Contributory Negligence of Decedent in Wrongful Death Action
In an action for the negligent shooting of plaintiff's husband by a New
York City policeman, verdict was for the defendants. Plaintiff appealed alleging
errors in the instructions to the jury. The automobile of the decendent had collided
with another automobile and the decedent was attempting to flee the scene of
the accident. The defendant patrolman, while not a witness to the accident, was
in the vicinity, and upon hearing cries of "hit and run" from several spectators,
gave chase. His patrol car collided with the car of decedent after the latter's
car had blown a tire. The decedent had jumped from his car and was attempting
to flee on foot when defendant patrolman, after calling the decedent to stop,
fired a shot which ricocheted off decedent's car, struck and killed him.
Appellant's contention was that the trial court erroneously charged the jury
on the question of decedent's contributory negligence. The effect of this charge
was to allow the jury to find that if the deceased was negligent in the initial ac-
cident, from which he was fleeing, he could be contributorily negligent as to
the shooting by defendant patrolman. The Court in Fields v. City of New York39
held this to be prejudicial error and ground for a new trial stating that even con-
ceding decedents negligence in the prior collision, this incident was wholly sepa-
rate and unrelated to the shooting, especially in view of the fact that the officer
had not even witnessed the accident.
The appellant also alleged error in the instruction to the jury on the question
of justifiable homicide. The charge was correct in stating that leaving the scene
39. 4 N.Y.2d 334, 175 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1958).
